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Abstract
Judgments regarding the strength of a cause to produce an outcome do not always follow
predictions of normative causal reasoning models (Kao & Wasserman, 1993). In the case of the
outcome density effect, individuals’ ratings of the strength of a putative cause tend to be greater
when the number of observed outcomes is high than when it is low (e.g. Jenkins & Ward, 1965).
In the current experiment, I investigated the outcome density effect as a possible heuristic.
Participants made causal judgments based on information about the prevalence of headaches in a
sample of individuals who did or did not receive a mineral. To manipulate cognitive load, stimuli
differed in sample size (n = 24 or 72) and presentation format (scrambled or organized
information). Although each stimulus depicted a non-contingent relationship, there were
pervasive outcome density effects for causal judgments in each condition. However, the
probability of the outcome had no effect on estimates of causal power, suggesting the importance
of how causal questions are worded. Manipulations of cognitive load did not influence the
magnitude of the outcome density effect for causal judgments or affect causal power estimates.
Thus, the outcome density effect does not appear to be used as a heuristic in tasks that vary in
cognitive demand, at least as manipulated by sample size and the organization of information.

viii

Introduction
The ability to accurately assess the relationship between a cause and an outcome enables
individuals to respond appropriately to events in the world. However, individuals’ judgments
regarding the strength of a causal relationship do not always coincide with normative measures
of covariation and causation. Instead, judgments sometimes reflect either less sophisticated
information integration strategies or the use of heuristics (e.g., Fielder, 2009; Fleig, Meiser,
Ettlin, & Rummel, 2017; Kao & Wasserman, 1993).
Heuristics are simple strategies or shortcuts that can be used to make judgments or
decisions in cases of uncertainty (see Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), potentially leading to nonnormative outcomes. For example, the availability heuristic describes instances when individuals
make inferences about the frequencies of an event based on easily or quickly recallable (i.e.,
available) instances of the event. Heuristics can be beneficial in cognitively demanding
situations, such as when an individual must complete a task in a limited amount of time.
Alternatively, the use of heuristics can be disadvantageous, such as when a doctor incorrectly
makes a diagnosis based on easily recallable instances of a disease despite its true rate of
occurrence.
One example of non-normative reasoning in causal inference is the outcome density
effect. The outcome density effect is observed when individuals increase their judgments of
causal strength as the number of outcomes increases, regardless of the actual contingency
between the putative cause and outcome. To illustrate, imagine a gardener wants to determine the
extent to which two brands of fertilizer generate plant growth. He applies Fertilizer A to 6 of 12
plants in one plot and Fertilizer B to 6 of 12 plants in another. In plot A, 4 of 6 fertilized and 4 of
6 unfertilized plants grow. In plot B, 2 of 6 fertilized and 2 of 6 unfertilized plants grow. An
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example of an outcome density effect would be if the gardener assumes Fertilizer A to be
stronger because he observed a larger amount of plant growth, although neither fertilizer had an
actual influence on plant growth.
In one of the first demonstrations of the outcome density effect, participants were
instructed to illuminate a light by choosing to press or not press one of two buttons on each of 60
trials (Jenkins & Ward, 1965, Experiment 1). Participants then judged the degree to which their
actions caused the light to turn on using a rating scale from 0 (no control) to 100 (total control).
In three conditions, participants’ actions had no influence on the outcome (i.e., the light turning
on), but their ratings of control increased as the probability of the outcome increased from 0.13
to 0.50 to 0.80 (see Figure 1).
100

80

60
Mean Rating of
Judged Control
(0 - 100)

40

20

0
Low OD (.13)

Medium OD (.50)

High OD (.80)

-20

Figure 1. Data from Jenkins and Ward (1965, Experiment 1). When ΔP was held constant at 0,
participants’ ratings of control over the outcome increased as outcome density (OD) increased,
despite no existing relationship between the cause and the outcome. Error bars indicate SD.
Normative models of causal judgment (e.g., Allan, 1980; Cheng, 1997) cannot fully
account for outcome density effects, such as the one observed by Jenkins and Ward (1965), in
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which there was no relationship between the cause and the outcome. The goal of this paper is to
investigate whether outcome density may be a heuristic that people use when under cognitive
load. Dual process models of cognition suggest that individuals may employ one of two separate
systems – or sets of cognitive processes – for reasoning and decision making (e.g., Sloman,
1996). System 1 is automatic and effortless, resulting in quick, intuitive responses, whereas
System 2 involves slower and more effortful reasoning (Kahneman & Frederick, 2001). Thus,
heuristics are a component of system 1, which may be overridden by system 2 reasoning. If
cognitive demand is too great or there is insufficient time, however, system 2 may fail and
individuals will rely upon heuristics (e.g., Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000).
Because the use of heuristics increases with increases in cognitive load, we may be able to test
the hypothesis that the outcome density effect is a heuristic by observing whether outcome
density effects increase under increasing cognitive load. The remainder of this introduction will
review normative models of causal judgment, review evidence for the prevalence of outcome
density effects in causal judgment, and discuss manipulations that may affect the cognitive
demands of the causal learning task.
In Jenkins and Ward’s (1965) early demonstration of outcome density, they used a freeoperant trial-by-trial design, in which participants were to determine whether their action (i.e.,
pressing a button) determined the presence or absence of the outcome. However, outcome
density effects in free-operant designs may be influenced by alternative variables such as the
temporal contiguity between the participant’s action and the outcome (see Vallée-Tourangeau,
Murphy, & Baker, 2005). In contrast, many studies on causal learning utilize either a passive
trial-by-trial design in which the cause-outcome contingencies are revealed over a series of trials,
or a summary design, in which the frequency information is supplied to participants in a
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summary format. Because of possible temporal contiguity effects in free-operant designs, this
paper focuses on discrete trial-by-trial and summarized designs.
Normative Models of Covariation and Causal Judgment
If the outcome density effect does not reflect normative causal judgments, then what
constitutes normative causal inference? Most normative theories of causal inference rely on an
estimate of contingency, that is, the relationship between the cause and the outcome. Some
normative models, such as the ΔP rule (Allan, 1980) and the power PC model (Cheng, 1997), are
rule-based and posit that individuals make causal judgments by calculating statistical
probabilities from the evidence. Other normative models, such as the Rescorla-Wagner (1972)
model, are associative and propose that causal judgments are based on learning associations
between the putative cause and the outcome.
ΔP Rule. According to the ΔP rule, normative causal judgments are based on the
probability of an outcome in the presence versus the absence of a putative cause (Allan, 1980). In
causal learning tasks regarding binary events, participants typically make causal judgments after
they observe the presence or absence of an outcome in the presence or absence of a target cause.
This information can be organized into a contingency table so that each cell totals the number of
observations for each cause-outcome combination (see Figure 2).
Cause
Present
Absent

Outcome
Present
Absent
a
b
c

d

!

p(o|c) = !!!

!

p(o|~c) = !!!
!!!

p(o) = !!!!!!!
Figure 2. Sample contingency table displaying the four possible combinations of a cause and
outcome. Equations on the right refer to the probability of the outcome occurring in the presence
of the cause, p(o|c), the probability of the outcome occurring in the absence of the cause, p(o|~c),
and the overall probability of the outcome, p(o).
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The value of ΔP is equal to the difference between the probability of the outcome
occurring in the presence, p(o|c), and the absence, p(o|~c), of the cause (Equation 1). When a
causal relationship is generative, ΔP is positive, suggesting the cause produces the outcome.
Recalling the previous gardener example, ΔP is positive and the fertilizer generates plant growth
if the probability of bloomed plants is greater in the presence than the absence of the fertilizer.
When a causal relationship is preventive, ΔP is negative, suggesting the cause inhibits the
outcome. If the probability of bloomed plants is larger in the fertilizer’s absence than its
presence, ΔP is negative and the fertilizer prevents plants from blooming. When a relationship is
non-contingent, ΔP is equal to zero, suggesting the cause has no effect on the outcome. Thus, if
the probability of bloomed plants is the same in the presence and the absence of the fertilizer, ΔP
is equal to zero and the fertilizer has no effect on plant growth.
ΔP = p(o|c) - p(o|~c)

(1)

Power PC Model. The ΔP rule suggests that individuals base causal judgments on the
extent to which a relationship exists between the cause and the outcome. A correlation between
two events, however, does not necessarily imply causation, as alternative causes may be
responsible for an effect. The Power PC model (Cheng, 1997) is a newer, more theoretically
complex model that proposes a number of boundary conditions and assumptions that individuals
make when judging causation from covariation. Of most importance here, Cheng theorized that
individuals scale their causal judgments with the base rate of the outcome, p(o|~c). For
generative causes, causal power is calculated as:
𝑞=

!!
!!!(!|~!)

As p(o|~c) increases, the value of the denominator, 1 – p(o|~c), decreases. Thus, the
generative power of the cause, q, will increase as the base rate approaches 1. When p(o|~c) is
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(2)

equal to 1, the value of the denominator is equal to 0 and q is undefined. To use the previous
example, if plants always grow in the absence of a fertilizer (i.e., p(o|~c) = 1), a gardener cannot
make assumptions regarding the fertilizer’s influence on plant growth.
In preventive relationships, however, p(o|~c) is the critical scalar (see Equation 3). For a
preventive cause with constant ΔP, ratings of the strength of the target cause increase as p(o|~c)
approaches 0, but is undefined at 0 (e.g., a gardener cannot make any judgments about the
strength of a weed-killer in a plot without weeds).
𝑝=

!!!
!(!|~!)

(3)

Both the generative (Equation 2) and preventive (Equation 3) equations can be used to
model the strength of non-contingent relationships. If ΔP is equal to zero, the numerators of p
and q will be equal to zero, so that causal strength is also zero. Therefore, for non-contingent
relations, both ΔP and the power PC model predict causal estimates to be zero.
Rescorla-Wagner Model (RWM). The Rescorla-Wagner (1972) model, initially designed
to describe animal learning in classical conditioning, models how animals learn associations
between two stimuli over time. When adapted to explain human causal reasoning, the RWM
predicts causal judgments to change with new information over a series of trials. Individuals’
causal judgments are described as the change in associative strength (ΔV) between the putative
cause (C) and an outcome (E) on the current trial (i), or ΔVC-Ei (see Equation 4).
ΔVC-Ei = α β (λ – ΣVi)

(4)

During a trial, individuals observe the presence or absence of a cause in the presence or
absence of an outcome, which alters the associative strength between the two. ΣVi represents the
sum of these associative strengths in that trial (i). The rate of learning for the associative
strengths is modulated by two parameters for the outcome (α) and the cause (β). As new
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information is introduced, the value of ΣVi becomes closer to the learning asymptote (λ), the
maximum value of the association. Over time, the learner will update previous beliefs in the
associative strengths with new information, so that the RWM is an error-correcting algorithm.
When there is only one potential cause, as described above, the asymptotic result of the RWM is
mathematically equal to ΔP and the model predicts causal judgments to reflect the contingency
of the cause-outcome relationship (see Chapman & Robbins, 1990).
Outcome Density Effect and Models of Causal Judgment. Despite evidence that the ΔP
rule (e.g., Lober & Shanks, 2000) and the power PC model (e.g., Buehner & Cheng, 1997) can
accurately predict causal judgments in many circumstances, neither model fully accounts for the
outcome density effect. When ΔP is held constant, the ΔP rule does not predict changes in causal
judgments based on increased outcome density as p(o|c) and p(o|~c) will change proportionately
for generative, preventive, and non-contingent relationships (Equation 1).
Power PC predicts outcome density effects in contingent, but not in non-contingent
relations. For non-contingent relations, ΔP is equal to zero, and the numerator of the power PC
equations for both generative (Equation 2) and preventive (Equation 3) relations will be equal to
zero. Thus, p(o) does not influence predicted causal power estimates. The model does predict,
however, that p(o) will affect causal judgments for generative and preventive relationships. If
p(o) increases, p(o|~c) will also increase, causing the denominator of the power PC model to
decrease for generative (see Equation 2) and increase for preventive (see Equation 3)
relationships. As the denominator decreases, power PC predicts that judgments of causal strength
will increase for generative and decrease for preventive relationships.
In contrast to the predictions of the power PC and ΔP models, the RWM suggests that
outcome density effects may occur early on in learning for non-contingent causes, depending on
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the sequence of the training trials (Musca, Vadillo, Blanco, & Matute, 2010). As individuals
review more trials, the sum of associative strengths on the current trial (ΣVi) will approach the
learning asymptote (λ), which is the maximum learned strength of the association. That is, this
model predicts that outcome density effects in pre-asymptotic causal judgments will dissipate as
individuals update their beliefs with new information and ΣVi approaches λ. The RWM,
however, only makes predictions for trial-by-trial learning – the design utilized in most studies of
outcome density. In the current experiment, I implemented a summarized design. Therefore, the
RWM does not apply.
Demonstrations of the Outcome Density Effect
No models of causal learning can fully account for the outcome density effect. For
example, ΔP does not predict a role of outcome density in causal judgments and the power PC
model does not predict outcome density effects for non-contingent relationships. Still, outcome
density effects are well documented in the literature for non-contingent, generative, and
preventive relationships.
In causal learning tasks, participants judge the extent to which a relationship exists
between the cause and the outcome at the end of a series of trials or after reviewing the summary
information either using a bi-directional scale from -100 (the cause always prevents the outcome)
to +100 (the cause always produces the outcome) or a unidirectional scale from 0 (no
relationship) to +100 (cause always has an effect on the outcome).
Outcome Density Effects for Non-contingent Relationships. The majority of outcome
density research looks at the effect when ΔP is equal to zero. As can be seen across studies in
Table 1, causal judgments for non-contingent relationships tend to increase as the probability of
the outcome, p(o), increases (e.g., Allan, Siegel, & Tangen, 2005).
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Table 1
Outcome Density Effects for Non-contingent Relationships
Study
Presentatio Sample Findings
n Type
Size
Allan et al.
TBT
60
OD effect. Causal ratings increased as p(o) increased
(2005)
from low (.2) to medium (.5) to high (.8) when rated
after 20, 40, and 60 trials.
Allan et al.
TBT
60
OD effect. More likely to classify a relationship as
(2008, Exp. 3)
‘strong’ as opposed to ‘weak’ in the high (.7) than in
the low (.3) outcome density condition.
Blanco et al.
TBT
100
OD effect. Causal ratings were greater in the high (.8)
(2013, Exp. 1)
than in the low (.2) condition.
Buehner &
TBT
16
OD effect. As the probability of the outcome increased,
Cheng (1997,
causal ratings decreased in the preventive scenario (1a)
Exp. 1a, 1b)
and increased in the generative (1b) scenario.
Buehner &
Summary
100
OD effect. There was a negative and positive linear
Cheng (1997,
(Pie Chart)
trend as p(o) increased for relationships framed as
Exp. 2a, 2b)
preventive (2a) and generative (2b), respectively.
Further analysis suggests that the effect is driven by an
OD effect at extreme values of p(o), specifically when
p(o) = 0.
Buehner et al.
TBT
16
OD effect. In a between-subjects design, researchers
(2003, Exp. 1)
saw a positive and a negative linear OD trend for
causal ratings of participants in the generative scenario
and participants in the preventive scenario,
respectively.
Buehner et al.
Summary
72
No OD effect. Researchers specifically asked if the
(2003, Exp. 2)
(Countable
cause influenced the outcome and 47/50 participants
Images)
said the cause had no effect.
Buehner et al.
TBT
24
OD effect. Although most (20/31) participants said
(2003, Exp. 3)
there was no relationship, there was an OD effect for
those who believed there was a relationship.
Crump et al.
TBT
60
OD effect. Causal judgments were greater in the high
(2007)
(.8) than in the low (.2) condition.
Musca et al.
TBT
50
OD effect. Causal judgments were greater in the high
(2010)
(.8) than in the low (.2) condition.
Perales &
TBT
n/a1
OD effect. Causal judgments were greater in the high
Shanks (2003,
(.8) than in the low (.2) condition.
Exp. 2)
Note. OD = outcome density effect. TBT = trial-by-trial design; Sample size = number of trials
in a TBT design or total number of instances in a summary chart.
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Participants studied as many trials as needed to make a causal judgment that was 100% reliable,
for an average of 35.6 and 36.6 trials when p(o) = .2 and .8, respectively.
9

To walk through a typical study, Allan et al. (2005) gave participants information about
the rate of bacteria survival (outcome) when a chemical (cause) was or was not added to the
bacteria. In each trial, participants learned whether the cause was present or absent and then
made a prediction about whether the bacteria would survive (outcome present) or not (outcome
absent). After 60 trials, they rated the effect of the chemical on a scale of -100 (negative effect on
survival) to +100 (positive effect on survival). As seen in Figure 3, causal judgments increased
when the probability of bacteria survival was high even though the relationship was noncontingent.
50
40
30
20
Mean Causal
Ratings
(-100 - +100)

10
0
-10
-20

p(o) = .2

p(o) = .5

p(o) = .8

-30
-40
-50

Figure 3. Estimated mean causal ratings for non-contingent causes with low, medium, or high
levels of outcome density (OD) after reviewing 60 trials (causal ratings were approximated based
on the data presented in Figure 3 of Allan et al., 2005). Causal judgments increased as the
probability of the outcome, p(o), increased.
Although participants’ causal judgments revealed an outcome density effect, p(o) had no
effect on participants’ predictive judgments. Using participants’ predictions, Allan et al. (2005)
calculated p(o|c) and p(o|~c) to determine an ‘observed’ value of ΔP. These observed ΔP values
closely reflected normative expectations set by the ΔP rule (i.e., a judgment of zero), suggesting
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that while participants’ final causal estimates were influenced by the probability of the outcome,
they were able to detect the actual contingency. Therefore, the outcome density effect cannot
simply be explained by an incorrect perception of cause-outcome combinations. Although the
outcome density effect for causal judgments is pervasive in studies of non-contingent
relationships, it is incompatible with normative models of causal judgment and its nature is
uncertain.
Outcome Density Effects for Generative Relationships. In Allan et al.’s (2005) study,
participants also made causal judgments about a generative relationship. As they found with noncontingent relationships, mean causal judgments increased as p(o) increased when ΔP was equal
to .467 (see Figure 4).
60
50
40
Mean Causal
Ratings
30
(-100 - +100)
20
10
0
Low OD (.33)

Medium OD (.50)

High OD (.67)

Figure 4. Approximates of participants’ mean causal ratings after reviewing 60 trials (estimates
based on Figure 3 in Allan et al., 2005). Mean causal ratings increased as the probability of the
outcome, p(o), increased from low (.33) to medium (.50) to high (.67).
Table 2 summarizes the studies investigating outcome density in generative relationships,
in which causal judgments frequently increase as p(o) increases. Although several studies
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document outcome density effects for generative relationships, the presence of an outcome
density effect is not consistently supported at each value of ΔP (e.g., Buehner, Cheng, &
Clifford, 2003). In addition, outcome density effects for generative relationships may be
sensitive to presentation format (e.g., Wasserman, Elek, Chatlosh, & Baker, 1993), as will be
discussed later in this paper.
Table 2
Outcome Density Effects for Generative Relationships
Study
Presentation Sample
ΔP
Format
Size
Allan et al. (2005)
TBT
60
.467

Allan et al. (2008,
Exp. 3)

TBT

80

Buehner & Cheng
(1997, Exp. 1b)

TBT

16

Buehner & Cheng
(1997, Exp. 2b)
Buehner et al.
(2003, Exp. 1)
Buehner et al.
(2003, Exp. 2)

Summary
(Pie Chart)
TBT

100

Summary
(Countable
Images)
TBT

72

Buehner et al.
(2003, Exp. 3)
Crump et al. (2007)

16

Findings

Mixed results. OD effect as p(o)
increased from low (.333) to medium
(.467) to high (.667). Found for causal
judgments made after 40 and 60 but
not 20 trials.
.1, .2, .3, OD effect. The probability that a
.4, .5, .6 participant would classify a
relationship as “strong” as opposed to
“weak” increased as p(o) increased.
.25,
Mixed results. Significant OD effect
.5, .75 for ΔP = .25 and .50, approached
significance for ΔP = .75 (p = .052).
.25, .5, OD effect for each value of ΔP.
.75
.25, .5, Mixed results. OD effect for ΔP = .25
.75
and .5 but not .75.
.5
OD effect as p(o) increased from low
(.25) to medium (.58) to high (.75).

24

.5

OD effect as p(o) increased from low
(.25) to medium (.58) to high (.75).
TBT
60
.467
OD effect as p(o) increased from .33
to .67.
Lober & Shanks
TBT
60
.4
OD effect as p(o) increased from .2 to
(2000, Exp. 3)
.6 to .8. Evident OD effect each time
participants gave a causal judgment
(after viewing 20, 40, or 60 trials).
Lober & Shanks
Summary
100
.4
No OD effect. There was a nonlinear
(2000, Exp. 6)
(Pie Chart)
trend for causal ratings of p(o) = .2,
.6, and .8.
Note. OD = outcome density effect. TBT = trial-by-trial design; Sample size = number of trials
in a TBT design or total number of instances in a summary chart.
12

Outcome Density Effects for Preventive Relationships. In contrast to generative
relationships, outcome density effects occur in preventive relationships when causal judgments
become increasingly positive as p(o) increases. Strong preventive causes should inhibit the
outcome; therefore, outcome density effects in preventive causes will be shown by decreases in
preventive strength as the probability of the outcome increases.
For example, in Buehner et al. (2003), participants rated the extent to which a medicine
prevented headaches based on summarized information about the prevalence of headaches in a
sample of 72 individuals, half of whom received the medicine. When ΔP was held constant at .5, causal judgments were increasingly negative (i.e., judged as increasingly more preventive) as
the number of headaches decreased (see Figure 5).
10
0
-10
-20
-30
Mean
-40
Causal
Ratings
-50
(-100 to 0) -60
-70
-80
-90
-100

p(o) = .75
p(o) = .42
p(o) = .25

Figure 5. Participants’ mean causal ratings after reviewing summarized information about a
preventive relationship of ΔP = -.5 (Buehner et al., 2002). The absolute value of participants’
ratings decreased and became increasingly less negative as p(o) increased, demonstrating an
outcome density effect for preventive relations.
There is a considerable lack of research regarding the influence of p(o) for preventive
causes while holding ΔP constant, but the few extant studies are summarized in Table 3. The
results of these studies support the idea that the outcome density effects are not limited to
generative or non-contingent relationships, but also occur for preventive causes.
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Table 3
Outcome Density Effects for Preventive Relationships
Study
Presentation Sample
|ΔP|
Format
Size
Buehner & Cheng TBT
16
.25, .5, .75
(1997, Exp. 1a)
Buehner & Cheng Summary
100
.25, .5, .75
(1997, Exp. 2a)
(Pie Chart)
Buehner et al.
(2003, Exp. 1)
Buehner et al.
(2003, Exp. 2)

TBT

16

.25, .5, .75

Summary
(Countable
Images)
TBT

72

.5

Findings
OD effect for each value of ΔP.
Mixed results. Causal ratings
significantly decreased as p(o)
increased for ΔP = .25 and .75
but not ΔP = .5.
OD effect for each value of ΔP.

OD effect for each value of ΔP
as p(o) increased from low (.25)
to medium (.58) to high (.75).
Buehner et al.
24
.5
OD effect for each value of ΔP
(2003, Exp. 3)
as p(o) increased from low (.25)
to medium (.58) to high (.75).
Note. OD = outcome density. TBT = trial-by-trial design; Sample size = the number of trials in a
TBT design or total number of instances in a summary chart. ΔP values refer to the absolute
value of a negative (preventive) ΔP. An OD effect for a preventive relationship indicates that
causal judgments decrease as p(o) increases.
Outcome Density Effects in Other Dependent Measures. As previously described,
causal judgments are sensitive to changes in outcome density for non-contingent, generative, and
preventive causes. Other studies have demonstrated the pervasiveness of the outcome density
effect using other dependent measures. For example, individuals are more likely to classify a
non-contingent or generative relationship as “strong” as opposed to “weak” if the probability of
the outcome is high than if it is low (Allan, Hannah, Crump, & Siegel, 2008). In another study,
researchers found individuals’ actual behavior was sensitive to changes in outcome density
(Matute, Steegen, & Vadillo, 2004). Participants were more likely to exhibit preparatory
behavior during a video game when the probability of the outcome was high as opposed to
moderate. This suggests that outcome density affects not only numerical causal judgments but
also the overall perception of a relationship and how individuals use outcome density
information to interact in the world.
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Potential Manipulations for Influencing Cognitive Demand
Some normative models of causal learning, such as the power PC model (Cheng, 1997),
account for outcome density effects in generative and preventive relationships. However, no
model can account for outcome density effects when a causal relationship is non-contingent.
Still, individuals are sensitive to changes in the probability of the outcome, as outcome density
effects are pervasive in the literature. If normative models expect individuals to detect noncontingent relationships as non-causal, then why do outcome density effects occur? The current
experiment explores the possibility that individuals use outcome density as a heuristic during
cognitively demanding causal learning tasks.
Presentation Format. One way to manipulate cognitive demand is through the format for
presenting the contingency information. In a trial-by-trial design, participants are shown one
cause-outcome combination per trial. In a summarized design, the cause-outcome information is
displayed simultaneously in a variety of possible formats (see Figure 6). For both trial-by-trial
and summarized designs, the different cause-outcome combinations represent the four cells of
the contingency table (see Figure 2).
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A. Countable Images

B. Simple Phrases
7 of 12 individuals who received the mineral got a
headache.
5 of 12 individuals who received the mineral did not get a
headache.
4 of 12 individuals who did not receive the mineral got a
headache.
8 of 12 individuals who did not receive the mineral did not
get a headache.

C. Frequency Tree

D. Pie Chart

Figure 6. Four methods for organizing information in a summary design.
Individuals may rely on different strategies to make causal judgments depending on the
presentation format. In summarized designs, individuals appear to make causal judgments based
on the ΔP rule, which assumes equal weighting of the contingency cells (Kao & Wasserman,
1993; Ward & Jenkins, 1965). In trial-by-trial designs, however, individuals appear to implement
less sophisticated strategies and place greater weight on different cells. Causal judgments in trialby-trial designs may reflect use of the cell A strategy, in which individuals rely more heavily on
cell A (i.e., the frequency of the outcome in the presence of the cause; Kao & Wasserman, 1993).
An alternative strategy is the confirming cases heuristic, in which individuals rely on cell A and
cell D (i.e., the frequency of the outcome not occurring in the absence of the cause; Ward &
Jenkins, 1965).
Could increased use of the ΔP rule in summarized designs be due to the organization of
information? As seen in Figure 6, summarized designs present cause-outcome information in a
format that is similar to how the frequencies would be presented in a contingency table.
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Therefore, the organization of information may make it easier to calculate and compare
conditional probabilities. Ward and Jenkins (1965) actually used a contingency table to
disseminate cause-outcome information to participants in the summarized format condition. In
another condition, participants reviewed trial-by-trial information and then saw the same
information in a summarized contingency table. Although participants in the summarized-only
condition made causal judgments based on the ΔP rule, participants that saw both formats
appeared to rely on the confirming cases heuristic, the same strategy implemented by participants
who only saw trial-by-trial information.
Trial-by-trial designs place a greater demand on working memory, as participants must
keep track of the different cause-outcome combinations before making a final causal judgment.
In the Ward and Jenkins (1965) study, participants who only saw trial-by-trial information and
participants who saw both trial-by-trial and summarized information may have relied on the
confirming cases heuristic because of the increased cognitive load. Participants in the
summarized-only condition, however, may have more easily implemented the ΔP rule due to
decreased cognitive demand and the organization of contingency information.
Presentation format may also modulate the extent to which outcome density effects are
observed. If trial-by-trial designs are more cognitively demanding, then individuals may rely on
outcome density as a strategy to make causal judgments. In contrast, summarized designs may
not elicit strong outcome density effects because the organization of information leads
individuals to make normative judgments based on the ΔP rule. However, only three studies have
specifically manipulated the probability of the outcome for constant values of ΔP using both
trial-by-trial and summary designs (see Table 4).
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Table 4
Outcome Density Effects in Summary vs. Trial-by-Trial Designs
Study
ΔP
Presentation
Sample Findings
Type
Size
Buehner & Generative
TBT (Exp. 1b)
16
Mixed results. OD effect for ΔP =
Cheng
.25, .50. OD trend approached
(1997)
significance for ΔP = .75.
Summary (Pie
100
Mixed results. OD effect for ΔP =
Chart, Exp. 2b)
.25, .75, but not ΔP = .50.
Preventive
TBT (Exp. 1a)
16
OD effect for ΔP = -.25, -.50, -.75.
Summary (Pie
100
OD effect for ΔP = - .25, -.50, -.75.
Chart, Exp. 2a)
NonTBT (Exp. 1)
16
OD effect. Causal ratings increased
contingent
or decreased as p(o) increased for
participants who saw the
relationship framed as generative
(Exp. 1b) or preventive (Exp. 1a),
respectively.
Summary (Pie
100
OD effect. Causal ratings increased
Chart, Exp. 2)
for participants who saw the
relationship framed as generative
(Exp. 2b); the trend seemed to be
due to close-to-zero ratings for p(o)
= 0 as ratings were not different for
p(o) = .25, .50, and .75. Causal
ratings decreased for participants
who saw the relationship framed as
preventive (Exp. 2a); the trend
seemed to be due to close-to-zero
ratings for p(o) = 1 as ratings were
not different for p(o) = .25, .50, and
.75.
Buehner et Generative
TBT (Exp. 1)
16
Mixed results. Observed OD effect
al. (2003)
for ΔP = .25 and .50, but not ΔP =
.75.
TBT (Exp. 3)
24
OD effect for ΔP = .50.
Summary
72
OD effect for ΔP = .50.
(Countable
Images, Exp. 2)
Preventive
TBT (Exp. 1)
16
OD effect for ΔP = -.25, -.50, -.75.
TBT (Exp. 3)
24
OD effect for ΔP = -.50.
Summary
72
OD effect for ΔP = -.50.
(Countable
Images, Exp. 2)
NonTBT (Exp. 1)
16
OD effect. Causal ratings increased
contingent
or decreased if the relationship
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TBT (Exp. 3)

24

TBT (Exp. 4)

24

framed as generative or preventive,
respectively.
OD effect. Most (20/31) participants
said there was no relationship, but
there was an OD effect for the 11
who believed there was a generative
relationship.
No OD effect. No relationship
between causal ratings and p(o);
participants were given randomly
“spot-checks” between trials and
asked to state whether the
relationship was generative,
preventive, or non-contingent.
No relationship. 47/50 participants
said there was no relationship.

Summary
72
(Countable
Images, Exp. 2)
Lober &
Generative
TBT (Exp. 3)
60
OD effect for ΔP = .40.
Shanks
Summary (Pie
100
No OD effect for ΔP = .40.
(2000)
Chart, Exp. 6)
Note. TBT = trial-by-trial design; sample size = number of trials in a TBT design or total number
of instances in a summary chart; OD effect = increases in causal judgments for generative and
non-contingent causes or decreases in causal judgments for preventive causes as the probability
of the outcome, p(o), increases.
In the trial-by-trial conditions, the studies in Table 4 found fairly reliable outcome density
effects for generative, preventive, and non-contingent relationships. In the summarized
conditions, two of the studies revealed outcome density effects for generative and preventive
conditions at most levels of ΔP (Buehner & Cheng, 1997; Buehner et al., 2003). Lober and
Shanks (2000), however, did not find evidence of an outcome density effect when individuals
reviewed information about a generative relationship in a pie chart. For the two studies that
examined non-contingent relationships, Buehner and Cheng (1997) found evidence of an
outcome density effect. In contrast, a strong majority (94%) of participants in Buehner et al.’s
(2003) study explicitly stated there was no relationship at either level of outcome density.
From the limited research on outcome density in summarized vs. trial-by-trial designs, it
appears that the use of outcome density to guide causal judgments is somewhat dependent on
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presentation format. As previously discussed, this may be due to how the information is
organized within a summarized design. One study examined how outcome density affected
causal judgments about non-contingent and generative relationships within multiple summarized
designs (see Figures 6 A, B, and C), finding evidence of outcome density effects in each
condition (Vallée-Tourangeau, Payton, & Murphy, 2008). However, individuals’ ability to
distinguish between the non-contingent and contingent relationships (i.e., give higher causal
ratings in the contingent condition) varied depending on the type of summarized design.
Vallée-Tourangeau, Payton, and Murphy (2008) gave participants information about noncontingent and generative relationships using countable images, simple phrases, or a frequency
tree (see Figure 6 A, B, and C). Causal judgments increased as the probability of the outcome
increased, producing an outcome density effect in each of the three display conditions. However,
the ability to distinguish between a non-contingent relationship and contingent relationship (i.e.
give higher causal ratings in the contingent condition) varied depending upon the summary
display. When participants saw causal information in simple sentences, they could not
distinguish between contingency values at either p(o) whereas they could do so for both high and
low outcome density levels if the information was organized in frequency trees. When
participants saw countable objects, ratings of contingent relationships were only higher than noncontingent relationships if p(o) was high.
Although Vallée-Tourangeau et al. (2008) found outcome density effects in multiple
types of summarized designs, the information presented in Table 4 suggests that outcome density
effects may not be as prominent in summarized designs as they are in trial-by-trial presentations.
For example, to maintain a constant value of ΔP = 0, p(o|c) and p(o|~c) must be equal such that
the number of outcomes is the same in the presence and the absence of the cause. Therefore, it
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may have been easy to identify a non-contingent relationship in the summarized formats used
previously.

Figure 7. Example of stimuli to be used in the present experiment, similar to the stimuli used in
Buehner et al. (2003). In the organized sample, participants may more easily identify the
relationship as non-contingent because the proportion of outcomes is clearly the same in the
presence and the absence of the cause. The same information is presented in the scrambled
sample, but in a less identifiable manner.
To address this concern, participants in the current experiment reviewed countable
images in summarized designs that were either organized or scrambled (see Figure 7). In the
organized condition, the prevalence of headaches was clearly the same in the presence and
absence of the mineral (i.e., the putative cause), similar to that of Buehner et al.’s (2003) noncontingent example. In the scrambled condition, participants reviewed a random organization of
the same information. Whereas the organized design may obviate the need for attending to
outcome density information, the scrambled design may prevent participants from easily
recognizing the non-contingent relationship. Because the scrambled information is less
discernible (i.e., more cognitively demanding), participants may be more likely to rely on a
heuristic to guide causal judgments. If individuals demonstrate greater outcome density effects in
the scrambled than the organized condition, this would suggest that individuals rely on outcome
density effect as a heuristic to guide causal judgments during more cognitively demanding tasks.
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Reasoning with Large Numbers. A second potential manipulation for influencing
cognitive load is asking participants to make casual judgments about larger versus smaller
samples of data. Larger numbers are represented less distinctly in the brain and prove to be more
difficult compared to working with smaller numbers (Göbel et al., 2001; Nieder & Merten,
2007). If larger numbers are more difficult to work with, perhaps people are more likely to
employ a heuristic, such as relying on p(o), as a cue to causality when making inferences from
larger numbers.
The importance of numerical size is illustrated in magnitude comparison tasks. In a
magnitude comparison task, participants determine whether a target number is greater or less
than a previously established reference number (e.g., Moyer & Landauer, 1976). To illustrate,
Göbel et al. (2001) asked participants if target numbers were greater or less than the reference
numbers 5 and 65. Participants were quicker and more accurate at this task as the distance
between the target and the reference number increased. For example, they would be quicker to
determine that 1 is less than 5 than to determine that 4 is less than 5. This effect was more
pronounced when participants compared target numbers with the reference number 65. The
difference in reaction times between numbers close (e.g., 64) and far (e.g., 20) from 65 was
greater than the difference in reaction times between numbers close (e.g., 4) and far (e.g., 1) from
5, producing what is called a size effect. These results suggest that larger numbers are less
distinctly represented than smaller numbers. Single-cell recording work supports this
interpretation. When rhesus monkeys were shown sets of black dots on a screen of varying
magnitude, recordings of single unit neuron activity suggested firing specificity for small, but not
large, numerical magnitudes (Nieder & Merten, 2007).
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Therefore, during a causal reasoning task, perhaps it is more difficult to reason with
larger sample sizes because larger numbers have less distinct mental representations. Both the
ΔP rule and power PC model suggest that individuals base causal ratings on comparisons of
frequency information (i.e., conditional probabilities). As the magnitude of these frequencies
increase, individuals may find it more difficult to make causal judgments using these statistical
rules and may rely upon heuristics to guide their causal judgments during tasks. Thus, the
outcome density effect, as a potential heuristic, may increase when individuals make causal
judgments about larger samples.
Current Experiment
The primary purpose of the current experiment was to investigate the possible use of
outcome density as a heuristic in causal learning. I did so by manipulating the cognitive demands
of the task. If individuals rely more on outcome density over normative models (e.g., ΔP rule) to
guide causal judgments in a cognitively demanding task, then this would suggest outcome
density is a heuristic.
Participants made causal judgments about the extent to which a relationship existed
between various minerals (i.e., putative causes) and headaches (i.e., outcome). Their job was to
determine whether each mineral produced headaches as a side effect, prevented headaches, or
had no effect on headaches. In a summarized design, participants learned about the prevalence of
headaches in a sample of individuals, half of whom received a mineral. Each mineral was noncontingent such that the probability of the outcome (i.e., headaches) was the same in the presence
and absence of the putative cause (i.e., mineral). After reviewing each stimulus, participants
made a causal judgment about the extent to which the mineral generated, prevented, or had no
effect on headaches. If participants gave higher causal judgments for a mineral when the
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probability of headaches was high [p(o) = .667] than when the probability of headaches was low
[p(o) = .333], this would be evidence of an outcome density effect.
To examine the use of outcome density as a possible heuristic, I manipulated cognitive
demand in two ways. First, I modified the sample size of the stimuli such that participants
learned about a small or large sample of either 24 or 72 individuals, respectively. With the
exception of streamed-trial designs (e.g., Crump et al., 2007), the majority of trial-by-trial
outcome density research uses small sample sizes of 16 to 24. I chose 24 as the small sample
condition not only to compare with the widely used trial-by-trial design, but also because 24 is
large enough to allow for an outcome density manipulation. Additionally, I chose 72 for the
more cognitively demanding, larger sample condition, because magnitude comparison tasks
suggest numbers this large should be represented less distinctly (Göbel et al. 2001).
Second, because it may be easier to detect non-contingent relationships in an organized
image where the probability of headaches is clearly the same in the presence and absence of the
mineral, I altered the presentation format so that the cause-outcome information was either
organized or scrambled (see Figure 7). If the cause-outcome information is less distinct,
individuals may be more likely to rely on heuristics when making causal judgments.
Finally, others have speculated that individuals may only rely on outcome density when
they fail to completely understand random assignment and the independence of alternative
causes (Buehner et al., 2003). If participants understand that individuals are randomly assigned
to receive or not receive a mineral, they should understand that the probability of headaches prior
to the study is the same in both groups. If participants understand independence of alternative
causes, they should understand that the putative strength of the mineral to affect headaches is
independent of alternative background causes. Therefore, when the proportion of headaches is
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the same in the group that receives a mineral and the group that does not receive a mineral,
headaches must be due to an alternative cause. I assessed whether participants who could
accurately answer questions about random assignment and the independence of alternative
causes would be less reliant on outcome density as a heuristic when making causal judgments. If
they have a strong understanding of experimental design, they may be less likely to use heuristics
and more likely to provide normative causal judgments.
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Methods
Participants
One hundred and seventy undergraduate students participated in exchange for course
credit. An a-priori power analysis (with G*Power 3.1) yielded a sample size of 70 as sufficient to
detect a small ( η p2 = .03) between-within interaction at a power of 0.95 in a repeated-measures
design using an alpha level of .05. After collecting data from 70 participants, initial data analyses
suggested that a larger sample was necessary to determine whether individual differences in the
understanding of random assignment and alternative causes interacted with outcome density.
After which, I aimed to double the sample size. Data from nine participants were not analyzed
because, contrary to instructions, they used scratch paper during the experiment. The final
sample of 161 participants (age: M = 19.30, SD = 2.86) consisted mostly of women (118
women, 41 men, 2 no responses) and undergraduate freshmen (74 freshmen, 64 sophomores, 11
juniors, 12 seniors).
Design
The experiment was a 2 (outcome density: high, low) x 2 (sample size: small, large) x 2
(presentation format: scrambled, organized) x 2 (order of presentation format: scrambled first,
organized first) mixed-design. Outcome density, sample size, and presentation format were
manipulated within-groups so that all participants learned about the same eight minerals. The
order of presentation format was counterbalanced between participants so that participants first
reviewed either the block of four organized or the block of four scrambled minerals.
Materials
Cover story. Participants read a cover story (adapted from Liljeholm & Cheng, 2009) in
which they imagined working at a pharmaceutical company that was developing an allergy
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medicine comprised of several minerals, each of which could cause or prevent headaches as a
side effect. The participants evaluated the results of studies done with eight different fictional
minerals to determine the effect each mineral had on headaches. Each mineral had a unique
alphanumeric label and was investigated by a different fictional laboratory to emphasize that
each mineral was distinct.
Comprehension check questions. To evaluate participants’ understanding of random
assignment and the independence of alternative background causes, they answered two
comprehension check questions (from Buehner et al., 2003) prior to evaluating the minerals. For
the comprehension check of random assignment, participants were told to assume individuals
were randomly assigned to one of two groups by a coin toss. If the coin landed on heads, the
individual was placed in the group that received the mineral. If the coin landed on tails, the
individual was placed in the group that did not receive the mineral. Participants then indicated
whether they expected the proportion of headaches in the group that received the mineral to be
greater than, less than, or about the same as the proportion of headaches in the group that did not
receive the mineral before the study began. An “about the same” response suggested an
understanding of random assignment.
For assessing participants’ knowledge of the independence of alternative causes,
participants were told that 50% of the individuals who received the mineral and 50% of the
individuals who did not receive the mineral had a headache. Using this information, participants
responded yes or no as to whether the headaches in the group of individuals who received the
mineral could be attributed to the mineral. A “no” response suggested an understanding of the
independence of alternative background causes.
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Stimuli. On each trial, participants learned summarized information (i.e., countable
images) about one mineral. I created eight different stimuli to represent each combination of the
outcome density (high, low), sample size (small, large), and presentation format (scrambled,
organized) conditions (see Table 5, see also Figures 8 and 9).
Table 5
Experimental Design.
Cell Frequencies
Sample Size

p(o)

p(o|c)

p(o|~c)

A

B

C

D

24
24
72
72

0.333
0.667
0.333
0.667

0.333
0.667
0.333
0.667

0.333
0.667
0.333
0.667

4
8
12
24

8
4
24
12

4
8
12
24

8
4
24
12

For each stimulus, half of the sample received the mineral (left side) and half of the
sample did not receive the mineral (right side), such that the probability of receiving the mineral
(i.e., probability of the cause) was p(c) = .5. The number of headaches present (i.e., cells a and c,
sick emoticons) and headaches absent (i.e., cells b and d, healthy emoticons) varied for each
stimulus depending on outcome density [p(o) = .333, .667] and sample size (n = 24, 72). Because
the probability of the outcome was the same in the presence and the absence of the putative
cause, however, ΔP was equal to zero for all eight minerals.
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A. Low Outcome Density (N = 24)

B. High Outcome Density (N = 24)

C. Low Outcome Density (N = 72)

D. High Outcome Density (N = 72)

Figure 8. Organized presentation format. Half of the sample received the mineral (left side of the
image) and half of the sample did not (right side).

A. Low Outcome Density (N = 24)

B. High Outcome Density (N = 24)

C. Low Outcome Density (N = 72)

D. High Outcome Density (N = 72)

Figure 9. Scrambled presentation format. Half of the sample received the mineral (left side of the
image) and half of the sample did not (right side).
The scrambled stimuli were created using a standardized procedure. To randomize the
placement of emoticons on both sides of the image, I segmented a pie chart into nine slices. Each
slice contained four placeholders for a total of 36 placeholders with a unique number (see Figure
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10). I randomly assigned (www.random.org) each sick or healthy emoticon to a placeholder and
repeated this procedure so that both sides of the image depicted a different scrambled
organization of sick and healthy emoticons.

Figure 10. Pie chart with placeholders used to generate scrambled faces.
Procedure
Participants completed the experiment on a computer using E-Prime 2.0 software. First,
participants read the cover story (see Appendix A) and answered the two comprehension check
questions regarding random assignment and the independence of alternative causes. Next,
participants reviewed information about each mineral for as long as they wanted before
forwarding to the next screen, on which they made their causal judgment regarding that mineral.
For each mineral, they made a causal judgment about the extent to which it influenced headaches
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on a scale of -100 (strong influence on preventing headaches) to +100 (strong influence on
producing headaches), where a value of 0 meant that the mineral had no influence on headaches.
Participants then answered a series of questions depending on their responses to the
causal judgment question (see Figure 11). If participants made a judgment of 0, they then made a
judgment about their confidence in the results from the lab on a scale of 0 (not at all confident)
to 10 (extremely confident) and proceeded to the next trial (from Liljeholm & Cheng, 2009).

Judgment = 0

Judgment > 0

Judgment < 0

Confidence Judgment

Generative Conditional
Probability Question

Preventive Conditional
Probability Question

Background Rate
Question

Background Rate
Question

Confidence Judgment

Confidence Judgment

Figure 11. The sequence of questions for each mineral depended on whether the participant
made a causal judgment of zero (non-contingent relationship), greater than zero (generative
relationship), or less than zero (preventive relationship).
If participants made a positive judgment (the mineral produced headaches), they then
answered a conditional probability question about the mineral’s generative strength: “Suppose
that Mineral X is given to 100 people who are not currently suffering from a headache. How
many of the 100 would develop a headache?” Next, they evaluated the background rate of
headaches: “Imagine a group of 100 people who have not been given the mineral. How many of
the 100 would have a headache?” Finally, they made a confidence judgment and proceeded to
the next trial. If participants made a negative judgment (the mineral prevented headaches), they
answered a conditional probability question about the mineral’s preventive strength: “Suppose
that Mineral X is given to 100 people who are currently suffering from a headache. How many of
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the 100 would no longer have a headache?” Next, they answered the background rate question,
made a confidence judgment, and proceeded to the next trial.
Participants viewed the four scrambled and four organized minerals in two uninterrupted
blocks and were randomly assigned to first review either the block of scrambled (n = 78) or
organized (n = 83) stimuli. I randomized the four minerals within each block to prevent possible
order effects of the outcome density or sample size conditions.
A number of participants spontaneously indicated that they noticed the left and right sides
of the stimuli were exactly the same. When doubling the sample size, I included an additional
open-ended question after participants evaluated all eight minerals: “Did you notice anything
about the experiment?” Finally, participants answered demographic questions about their age,
gender, and year in school.
Dependent Measures
Causal judgments. The primary variable of interest was the causal judgment that
participants made on a scale from -100 to +100. From these judgments, I calculated difference
scores between causal judgments for the high and low outcome density conditions. The
difference score reflects the magnitude of the outcome density effect for each participant within
each condition. Positive values mean that causal judgments were greater for the high outcome
density condition, indicating an outcome density effect. Negative values mean that causal
judgments were greater for the low outcome density condition, indicating the opposite of an
outcome density effect.
Causal power. I calculated causal power (Cheng, 1997) using participants’ responses to
the generative or preventive conditional probability question and the background rate question. If
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participants gave a positive causal judgment, I used the generative equation (see Equation 5) to
calculate causal strength:
# !" !!"#"$%!& !" !"" !"#!$" !"#$% !"# !"#$%&' !(# !" !"#$#%!"& !" !"" !"#!$" !"# !"#$% !"# !"#$%&')
!""!(# !" !"#$#%!"& !" !"" !"# !"#$% !"# !"#$%&')

(5)

If participants gave a negative causal judgment, I used the preventive equation (see
Equation 6) to calculate causal strength:
# !" !"#$#%!"& !" !"" !"#!$" !"#$% !"# !"#$%&' !(# !" !"#$#%!"& !" !"" !"#!$" !"# !"#$% !"# !"#$%&')
# !" !"#$#%!"& !" !"" !"# !"#$% !"# !"#$%&'

(6)

If participants gave a causal judgment of zero, their causal power was zero. As with
causal judgments, the magnitude of the outcome density effect was the difference in mean causal
power estimates for the high and low outcome density conditions.
Confidence judgments and response time data. Additional variables of interest
included confidence judgments, the amount of time participants reviewed each stimulus, and the
amount of time spent answering questions (i.e., causal judgments, generative power, preventive
power). This data was not transformed into difference scores, as there are no predetermined
normative standards for this information.
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Results
Data Analyses
I conducted all data analyses using R (Version 3.3.2). Primary data analyses of causal
judgments and causal power estimates included all participants (N = 161). Causal power analyses
excluded 17 cases, in which causal power could not be calculated: some participants made offscale responses (over 100) to the background rate question (n = 1); for some, the denominator of
the causal power equation was equal to zero and causal power was thus undefined (n = 6); and
for others, estimates could not be calculated due to missing responses from the background rate
(n = 9), preventive power (n = 1), or generative power (n = 1) questions. Secondary analyses
used a subset of the data based on participants’ responses to the comprehension check questions.
I excluded participants from these analyses if they did not answer the random assignment (n = 6)
or independence of alternative causes (n = 2) question.
Median causal judgments were equal to zero in each condition. Thus, to determine the
effect of outcome density, I conducted a Wilcoxon-ranked sum test for each condition (24organized, 72-organized, 24-scrambled, 72-scrambled). To determine the effect of cognitive
demand, all dependent variables were analyzed with separate linear mixed models, using
participants’ intercepts as the sole random factor and modelling as fixed factors the full 2
(sample size: small, large) x 2 (presentation format: organized, scrambled) x 2 (presentation
format order: organized first, scrambled first) factorial. Denominator degrees of freedom for the
fixed effects are Kenward-Rogers degrees of freedom. Measures of effect sizes for the outcome
density effect and cognitive demand factors are based on pairwise comparisons of interest and
are reported as Cohen’s d.
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All Participants
Causal judgments. As can be seen in Table 6, on average participants demonstrated an
outcome density effect across all conditions, giving significantly higher ratings in the high versus
low outcome density conditions (see also Figure 12). Seventy (43.48%) of the 161 participants
gave causal judgments of zero for all conditions, the expected normative causal judgment.
Table 6
Mean Causal Judgments for All Participants.
Sample
Outcome
Design
Size
Density
Organized
24
Low

M

Mdiff

Wilcoxon
Rank Sum
z = -2.87
p = .002

-5.15
13.14
(34.57)
(55.72)
High
7.99
d = 0.24
(35.42)
72
Low
-4.01
13.20
z = 3.59
(34.45)
(51.04)
p < .001
High
9.18
d = 0.26
(33.05)
Scrambled
24
Low
-6.31
19.04
z = 4.53
(32.01)
(50.61)
p < .001
High
12.73
d = 0.38
(36.60)
72
Low
-4.50
18.89
z = 4.19
(37.27)
(56.39)
p < .001
High
14.39
d = 0.33
(39.52)
Note. Causal judgments were made on a scale from -100 to +100. SDs in parentheses.

Because median causal judgments were equal to zero across all conditions, I conducted
four Wilcoxon-rank sum tests to non-parametrically test judgments for high versus low outcome
density minerals (see Table 6). Results revealed significant differences in ranked values for the
high and low outcome density minerals in all conditions2. As predicted, causal judgments were
greater for high than low outcome density minerals, suggesting a pervasive outcome density
effect in each condition despite median causal judgments being equal to zero.
Parametric one-sample t-tests also revealed that mean differences in causal judgments were
significantly different from zero across all conditions.
2

35

Figure 12. The magnitude of the outcome density effect represents the mean differences in
causal judgments between high and low outcome density minerals for each of the four
conditions. Error bars indicate standard error and d indicates Cohen’s dz (i.e., size of the
outcome density effect).
Effect of cognitive demand on causal judgments. As shown in Figure 13, there was an
outcome density effect in each condition such that mean differences in causal judgments were
positive (i.e., causal judgments were greater for high than low outcome density minerals).
Contrary to my predictions, however, the magnitude of this effect was independent of cognitive
demand manipulations.
The magnitude of the outcome density effect was slightly greater in the scrambled
condition (M = 18.96, SD = 53.50) than in the organized condition (M = 13.17, SD = 53.35).
However, the effect of presentation format was only marginally significant, F(1, 477) = 3.56, p =
.060, d = 0.11. Thus, increased cognitive load as a function of presentation format does not
appear to impact the outcome density effect. There were no effects of sample size, F(1, 477) <
1.0, p = .979, dz < .01, order of presentation format, F(1, 159) = 0.11, p = .737, dz = 0.04, nor
significant interactions (all p’s > .213). Because the magnitude of the outcome density effect was
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independent of cognitive load manipulations, individuals do not appear to use outcome density as
a heuristic when making causal judgments during cognitively demanding tasks.
Causal power. Mean causal power estimates were close to zero (i.e., a normative causal
power estimate) in each condition, as seen in Table 7. Of the 146 participants included in
analyses, 75 (51.37%) had causal power estimates equal to zero for all eight minerals either
because all initial causal judgments were equal to zero (n = 70) or all calculated causal power
judgments were equal to zero (n = 5). As such, median causal power estimates were equal to zero
for each condition.
Table 7
Mean Causal Power Estimates
Sample
Outcome
Design
Size
Density
Organized
24
Low
High
72

Low
High

Scrambled

24

Low
High

72

Low
High

M

Mdiff

0.05
(0.27)
0.02
(0.22)
0.06
(0.26)
0.02
(0.24)
0.05
(0.26)
0.01
(0.24)
0.05
(0.29)
0.06
(0.24)

-0.03
(0.34)
d = 0.09

Wilcoxon
Rank Sum
z = -0.54
p = .293

-0.04
(0.32)
d = 0.13

z = -1.27
p = .103

-0.04
(0.32)
d = 0.15

z = -2.29
p = .011

0.01
(0.33)
d = 0.03

z = 1.42
p = .922

Note. SDs in parentheses.
Because mean causal power estimates were close to zero, there did not initially appear to
be an effect of outcome density on causal power estimates in any condition. However, a
Wilcoxon-rank sum test revealed that rankings of mean causal power estimates were
significantly different between the high and low outcome density conditions when participants
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responded to questions in the scrambled-small sample condition, z = -2.29, p = .01134 (see Figure
13). There was an unexpected reversal of an outcome density effect, such that causal power
estimates were greater for the low than the high outcome density mineral in the scrambled-small
sample condition.

Figure 13. The magnitude of the outcome density effect represents the mean differences in
causal power estimates between high and low outcome density minerals for each of the four
conditions. Error bars indicate standard error and d indicates Cohen’s dz (i.e., size of the
outcome density effect).
I predicted an effect of outcome density in each condition, such that causal power
estimates would be greater in the high than the low outcome density minerals within each
condition. Instead, causal power estimates appeared relatively close to normative estimates of
zero in the scrambled-large sample, organized-small sample, and organized-large sample

3

Because of tied rank values, exact p-values could not be determined. Parametric one-sample ttests did not show mean differences in causal judgments to be significantly different from zero in
the scrambled-small sample condition.
4
Parametric one-sample t-tests supported this interpretation, as mean differences in causal power
estimates were not significantly different from zero in the scrambled-large sample, organizedsmall sample, and organized-large sample conditions.
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conditions5. Although individuals demonstrated significant outcome density effects for causal
judgments, this pattern was not replicated when evaluating estimates of causal power.
Effect of cognitive demand. As can be seen in Figure 14, participants demonstrated a
difference between the high and low outcome density conditions, but in a direction opposite that
of an outcome density effect when they first viewed the organized block than if participants first
viewed the scrambled block of minerals. In contrast, there was no effect of outcome density for
participants who first reviewed the scrambled condition. This interpretation was supported by a
main effect of the order of presentation format on mean differences in causal power estimates,
F(1, 157.71) = 8.46, p = .004, d = 0.25. While the direction of the effect in the organized-first
condition was unanticipated, it does not lend support to the theory that outcome density could be
used as a heuristic in cognitively demanding scenarios.

Figure 14. The magnitude of the outcome density effect represents the mean differences in
causal power estimates between high and low outcome density minerals for each of the four
conditions. Error bars indicate standard error and d indicates Cohen’s dz (i.e., size of the
outcome density effect).
5

Parametric one-sample t-tests supported this interpretation, as mean differences in causal power
estimates were not significantly different from zero in the scrambled-large sample, organizedsmall sample, and organized-large sample conditions.
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Neither presentation format, F(1, 467.02) = 0.72, p = .398, dz = .07, nor sample size F(1,
465.65) = 0.56, p = .454, dz = .06, had a significant effect on the magnitude of the outcome
density effect. Additionally, there were no significant interactions (all p’s > 0.226). As with
causal judgments, individuals do not use outcome density as a heuristic to inform estimates of
causal power in cognitively demanding tasks.
Subset Analyses Based on Comprehension Check Responses
I conducted separate analyses based on participants’ responses to the comprehension
check questions. Of the 153 participants who responded to both comprehension check questions,
33 answered both questions incorrectly, 72 answered one question correctly, and 48 answered
both questions correctly (see Table 8).
Table 8
Frequencies of Responses to Comprehension Check Questions
Category
Response
Independence of Alternative Causes
No (correct)
Yes (incorrect)

N
99
60

Random Assignment

Same (correct)
Greater Than (incorrect)
Less Than (incorrect)

73
20
62

Overall Comprehension Check

None Correct
One Correct
Both Correct

33
72
48

Causal judgments. The effect of outcome density on causal judgments depended on how
participants responded to the comprehension check questions (see Table 9). Within each group of
participants, median causal judgments were equal to zero in every condition, as many
participants gave causal judgments of zero for each mineral (both correct: n = 20 (41.67%), one
correct: n = 35 (48.61%), none correct: n = 12 (36.36%).
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Participants who answered one or both comprehension check questions correctly
demonstrated an outcome density effect. Mean differences in causal judgments were positive,
such that causal judgments were greater for the high than low outcome density conditions.
However, participants who answered neither question correctly appeared insensitive to the
outcome density manipulations. These results were supported by Wilcoxon-rank sum tests,
which only showed significant differences in ranked causal judgments between the high and low
outcome density conditions for the one correct and both correct groups6 (see Table 10).
Table 9
Mean Causal Judgments Based on Comprehension Check Responses
Both Correct
One Correct
None Correct
(N = 48)
(N = 72)
(N = 33)
Sample Outcome
Design
M
Mdiff
M
Mdiff
M
Mdiff
Size
Density
Organized
24
Low
-6.67
-8.46
5.15
18.13
15.28
2.27
(37.92)
(30.61)
(38.85)
(57.79)
(54.37)
(61.26)
High
11.46
6.82
7.42
d = 0.31
d = 0.28
d = 0.04
(35.70)
(34.56)
(41.43)
72
Low
-5.00
16.88
-4.75
11.88
-1.97
12.12
(38.25) (52.66) (33.49) (48.71)
(35.84) (59.62)
High
11.88 d = 0.32
7.13
d = 0.24
10.15
d = 0.20
(33.87)
(30.43)
(40.01)
Scrambled
24
Low
-10.23
29.06
-6.94
18.04
1.06
6.09
(35.13) (51.57) (24.74) (44.07)
(42.11) (62.06)
High
18.83
d = 0.56
11.10
d = 0.41
7.15
d = 0.10
(39.13)
(32.63)
(42.98)
72
Low
-3.77
21.73
-4.75
20.13
-11.55
16.79
(40.53) (61.67) (33.49) (44.78)
(44.54) (71.87)
High
17.96 d = 0.35 16.13
d = 0.45
5.24
d = 0.23
(37.94)
(33.98)
(53.15)
Note. Causal judgments were made on a scale from -100 to +100. SDs in parentheses.

6

These results were also supported by parametric t-tests. Mean differences in causal judgments
were significantly different from zero in the one correct and both correct groups. This trend did
not reach significance in the none-correct group.
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Table 10
Causal Judgment Wilcoxon-Rank Sum Test Statistics by Comprehension Check Responses.
Sample
Both Correct
One Correct
None Correct
Design
Size
(N = 48)
(N = 72)
(N = 33)
Organized
24
z = 2.03
z = 2.06
z = 1.15
p = .021
p = .020
p = .875
72
z = 2.69
z = 1.93
z = 0.81
p = .004
p = .027
p = .208
Scrambled
24
z = 3.19
z = 3.13
z = 0.14
p = .001
p = .001
p = .443
72
z = 2.21
z = 3.54
z = 1.01
p = .013
p < .001
p = .156
Note. Causal judgments were made on a scale from -100 to +100. SDs in parentheses.
Contrary to my predictions, participants who demonstrated an understanding of
experimental design by answering both questions correctly were still susceptible to the outcome
density effect. This suggests that the outcome density effect is pervasive and independent of
understanding random assignment or the independence of alternative causes. I hypothesized that
if participants had an incomplete understanding of experimental design (i.e., answered one or
neither question correct), they would be more sensitive to changes in outcome density. While
there was an effect of outcome density in the one correct group, this was not replicated in the
none-correct group.
Effect of cognitive demand. Cognitive demand manipulations only affected the influence
of outcome density on causal judgments in the group of participants who correctly answered one
of the comprehension check questions (n = 72). As can be seen in Table 11, there was a
significant three-way interaction between sample size, presentation format, and the order of
presentation format for the one-correct group, F(1, 210) = 5.79, p = .017.
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Table 11
Magnitude of the Outcome Density Effect on Causal Judgments for the One-Correct Group
Order of Presentation Format
Organized First
Organized
Scrambled

Sample Size

Mdiff

SDdiff

24
72
24a
72a

0.67
5.77
20.44
13.74

47.78
48.49
42.01
40.14

Scrambled First
Organized

24
32.55
57.28
72
19.09
48.71
Scrambled
24
15.21
46.87
72
27.67
49.28
Note. Mean differences in causal judgments between high and low outcome density conditions
for the group of participants (n = 72) who correctly answered one comprehension check
question. Subscript indicates a significant difference in the magnitude of the outcome density
effect via Tukey’s honestly significant difference test.
As depicted in Figure 15, this three-way interaction is driven by differences in causal
judgments for the scrambled condition if participants first saw the organized block of minerals.
In the organized-first group, the magnitude of the outcome density effect for the scrambled
condition (i.e., the second block they reviewed) was greater for the small sample size than the
large sample size. A Tukey’s HSD (honest significant difference) test revealed this difference to
be significant, t(209.99) = 2.64, p = .044, d = 0.16. There were no other significant pairwise
comparisons in the organized-first group (all ps > .208) or the scrambled-first group (all ps >
.148).
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Figure 15. The magnitude of the outcome density effect for causal judgments (mean differences
between high and low outcome density conditions) in the one-correct group. Error bars indicate
standard error.
Because these findings do not provide a straightforward interpretation of how cognitive
demand affects the magnitude of the outcome density effect, they do not support the use of
outcome density as a heuristic when individuals have an incomplete understanding of
experimental design (i.e., answered only one comprehension check question correctly).
For participants answering both questions correct (n = 48) and those answering neither
question correct (n = 33), there were no effects of the cognitive demand manipulations (all ps >
.118). Together, these findings suggest that the magnitude of the outcome density effect is
independent of cognitive demand manipulations even if participants have an incomplete
understanding of experimental design.
Causal power. For each group of participants, mean causal power estimates were close
to zero in each condition (see Table 12). Of the 161 participants, many in each group had causal
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power estimates equal to zero for each mineral [both correct: 21 (47.72%), one correct: 39
(60.00%), neither correct: 11 (36.67%)]. As such, median causal power estimates were equal to
zero in each condition.
Table 12
Mean Causal Power Estimates Based on Comprehension Check Responses
Both Correct
One Correct
None Correct
(N = 48)
(N = 72)
(N = 33)
Sample Outcome
Design
M
Mdiff
M
Mdiff
M
Mdiff
Size
Density
Organized
24
Low
0.08
0.06
0.01
-0.06
-0.05
0.07
(0.28)
(0.27)
(0.30)
(0.31)
(0.37)
(0.34)
High
0.02
0.00
0.08
d = 0.20
d = 0.14
d = 0.20
(0.18)
(0.24)
(0.26)
72
Low
0.09
-0.07
0.03
-0.03
0.10
-0.03
(0.28)
(0.41)
(0.27)
(0.21)
(0.24)
(0.39)
High
0.03
d = 0.17
-0.01
d = 0.16
0.07
d = 0.07
(0.21)
(0.24)
(0.28)
Scrambled
24
Low
0.09
-0.03
0.04
-0.06
0.04
-0.03
(0.27)
(0.30)
(0.24)
(0.24)
(0.31)
(0.34)
High
0.06
d = 0.10
-0.01
d = 0.23
0.01
d = 0.08
(0.25)
(0.23)
(0.28)
72
Low
0.09
-0.02
0.00
0.04
0.08
-0.02
(0.31)
(0.45)
(0.27)
(0.25)
(0.31)
(0.30)
High
0.08
d = 0.03
0.04
d = 0.16
0.08
d = 0.06
(0.23)
(0.20)
(0.35)
Note. Causal power estimates were calculated using the generative (see Equation 5) and
preventive (see Equation 6) formulas. SDs in parentheses.
Outcome density had no effect on estimates of causal power within the three groups of
participants. This is consistent with the whole-group analyses, in which there was no significant
effect of outcome density, and was confirmed by Wilcoxon-rank sum tests (see Table 13)7.

7

Because of tied rank and/or zero values, exact p-values could not be determined. These results
were supported by parametric one-sample t-tests, which did not reveal mean differences between
causal power estimates for high and low outcome density conditions to be significantly different
from zero.
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Table 13
Causal Power Estimate Wilcoxon-Rank Sum Test Statistics by Comprehension Check Responses
Sample
Both Correct
One Correct
None Correct
Design
Size
(N = 48)
(N = 72)
(N = 33)
Organized
24
z = 1.12
z = 0.50
z = 0.39
p = .132
p = .309
p = .350
72
z = 0.75
z = 0.48
z = 0.99
p = .227
p = .315
p = .839
Scrambled
24
z = 0.78
z = 1.54
z = 0.23
p = .218
p = .061
p = .410
72
z = 0.17
z = 1.54
z = 0.82
p = .433
p = .224
p = .794
Effect of cognitive demand. As I found for the entire sample, manipulations of sample
size and presentation format had no effect on the magnitude of the outcome density effect in any
of the three groups. For participants answering both questions correct (n = 48), participants
answering one question correct (n = 72), and those answering neither question correct (n = 33),
there were no effects of presentation format or sample size (all ps > .088). Thus, causal power
estimates are not sensitive to manipulations of cognitive demand even when participants have an
incomplete understanding of experimental design.
I did observe a non-significant, but marginal effect of counterbalancing in the one-correct
group: outcome density had a greater effect on causal judgments if participants first saw the
organized block (Mdiff = -.06, SDdiff = .27) than for participants who first saw the scrambled block
(Mdiff = .01, .27), F(1, 69.69) = 3.73, p = .058, dz = 0.31, for the main effect of counterbalancing
order. This pattern fits the findings for the entire sample, but was not replicated in the bothcorrect or none-correct groups (ps > .098).
Conditional Probability Questions
To determine if participants accurately tracked the frequencies of headaches, I analyzed
participants’ responses to conditional probability questions regarding the background rate (how
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many headaches in a group of 100 people who did not receive the mineral), generative power
(how many headaches in a group of 100 people who did receive the mineral), and preventive
power (how many would no longer have headaches in a group of 100 people who received the
mineral). Participants only responded to the generative or preventive power questions if they
made a positive or negative causal judgment for a mineral, respectively.
For the generative power and background rate questions, normative frequency estimates
would be 33 in the low outcome density condition and 67 in the high outcome density condition.
For the preventive power question, normative frequency estimates would be 67 in the low
outcome density condition and 33 in the high outcome density condition. Table 14 depicts the
average frequency estimates across all conditions. To assess the effects of outcome density,
sample size, presentation format, and the order of presentation format (i.e., counterbalancing
order), I conducted separate 2x2x2x2 ANOVA’s on raw responses to each of the questions.
Table 14
Mean Frequency Estimates for Conditional Probability Questions
Background Rate
Generative
Design
Sample Outcome
N
M
N
M
Size
Density
(SD)
(SD)
Organized 24
Low
159
36.07
18
36.44
(16.11)
(23.00)
24
High
160
53.34
37
59.62
(19.82)
(18.11)
72
Low
159
37.33
21
36.14
(17.05)
(24.93)
72
High
161
55.85
43
53.72
(19.37)
(21.48)
Scrambled 24
Low
159
39.02
15
42.40
(20.13)
(24.09)
24
High
160
53.84
41
60.00
(22.32)
(19.07)
72
Low
160
38.41
23
47.17
(20.68)
(29.50)
72
High
160
53.78
51
61.76
(19.67)
(20.77)
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Preventive
N
M
(SD)
35
58.51
(22.85)
12
38.50
(25.81)
35
61.29
(18.86)
8
46.88
(23.01)
32
63.56
(20.66)
11
37.36
(25.52)
39
55.03
(19.59)
10
51.50
(28.19)

Background rate. As seen in Table 15, the effect of outcome density on frequency
estimates about the background rate of headaches was modulated by an interaction with the order
of presentation format, F(1, 1104.19) = 22.07, p < .001. Frequency estimates were significantly
greater for the high than the low outcome density minerals in both the organized-first, d = 1.06,
and scrambled-first, d = 0.63, conditions, supported by a Tukey’s HSD test.
Table 15
Mean Background Rate Frequency Estimate by Outcome Density and Counterbalancing Order
Order of Presentation Format
Outcome Density
M
SD
Organized First

Low
33.63
Higha
54.61
Scrambled First
Low
42.00
Higha
53.78
Note. Subscript indicates non-significant differences via Tukey’s HSD test.

17.23
22.05
19.03
18.30

Pairwise comparisons also revealed that frequency estimates for low outcome density
minerals were significantly greater in the scrambled-first than the organized-first group, d = 0.46.
The initially scrambled information may have given the appearance of more headaches in the
low outcome density condition, which carried over to the organized block of minerals. There was
no significant difference in responses to the background rate question for the high outcome
density minerals between the organized-first and scrambled-first group, d = 0.04. The 2x2x2x2
ANOVA did not reveal other main effects or interactions to be significant (all ps > .419).
Overall, these results suggest that participants processed the background rate of the minerals and
made responses reflecting the difference between the low and high outcome density conditions.
Generative power. As expected, frequency estimates about generative power (see Table
14) were greater in the high (M = 58.87, SD = 20.08) than the low (M = 40.83, SD = 25.77)
outcome density conditions, F(1, 226.30) = 45.21, p < .001, d = 0.79. There was also a
significant main effect of presentation format, such that frequency estimates were greater in the
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scrambled (M = 56.39, SD = 23.34) than the organized (M = 49.84, SD = 23.29) conditions, F(1,
195.19) = 4.99, p = .027, d = 0.28. This provides additional support for the idea that the
scrambled design gave an impression of more headaches.
Additionally, there was a significant interaction between sample size and the order of
presentation format, F(1, 197.47) = 4.38, p = .038. However, Tukey’s HSD tests did not reveal
comparisons between any of the conditions to be significantly different from each other (all ps >
.097). There were no other significant main effects or interactions (all ps > .133).
Preventive power. Frequency estimates for the preventive power questions (see Table
14) were greater in the low (M = 59.38, SD = 20.55) than the high (M = 43.00, SD = 25.56)
outcome density conditions. A 2x2x2x2 ANOVA revealed the main effect of outcome density to
be significant, F(1, 160.69) = 11.33, p = .001, d = .706. There were no additional significant
main effects or interactions (all ps > .072).
Reaction Time Data
To evaluate the manipulation of cognitive load, I assessed the amount of time participants
spent reviewing stimuli prior to making a causal judgment and the amount of time participants
spent making a causal judgment. I conducted all analyses using the natural log of the reaction
time data. If participants spent more time spent reviewing data and making causal judgments in
the scrambled and/or large sample minerals, these conditions may be more cognitively
demanding than the organized and/or small sample conditions. Therefore, longer reaction times
in the scrambled and large sample conditions would support the presentation format and sample
size conditions as successful manipulations of cognitive load.
Time spent reviewing stimuli. The amount of time participants spent reviewing stimuli
depended on sample size, presentation format, the order of presentation format, and outcome
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density (see Table 16). The analysis of log reaction time data revealed two significant
interactions: an interaction between presentation format and sample size, F(1, 1113) = 7.93, p =
.005, and an interaction between presentation format and the order of presentation format, F(1,
1113) = 164.53, p < .001.
Table 16
Mean Time (milliseconds) Spent Reviewing Stimuli
Design
Sample Size
Outcome Density
Organized
24
Low
High
72
Low
High
Scrambled
24
Low
High
72
Low
High
Note. Table includes the natural log of raw reaction time data.

M (ms)
9.35
9.41
9.55
9.67
9.61
9.75
10.07
10.16

SD
0.80
0.87
0.90
0.85
0.72
0.83
0.75
0.91

As shown in Table 17, participants spent more time looking at the larger than the smaller
sample sizes. Tukey’s HSD tests revealed that the difference in reaction times between small and
large sample sizes was greater in the scrambled, d = 0.55, than the organized, d = 0.27,
conditions. All remaining pairwise comparisons were significant with the exception of the
average time spent reviewing the organized-large sample and scrambled-small sample
conditions. Overall, these results suggest that presentation format and sample size conditions
successfully manipulated cognitive load.
Table 17
Mean Time Spent Reviewing Mineral Data by Presentation Format and Sample Size
Presentation Format
Sample Size
M (ms)
SD (ms)
Organized
24
9.38
0.83
72a
9.61
0.88
Scrambled
24a
9.68
0.78
72
10.12
0.83
Note. Analyses used the natural log of raw reaction time data. Subscript indicates non-significant
differences in confidence judgments via Tukey’s HSD test.
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The effect of presentation format was also tempered by the order of presentation format
(see Table 18). Tukey’s HSD tests revealed that the organized-first participants spent longer
looking at organized stimuli than the scrambled-first group, d = 0.67, and the scrambled-first
participants spent longer looking at scrambled stimuli than the organized-first group, d = 0.49 (ps
< .001).
Table 18
Mean Time Spent Reviewing Mineral Data by Presentation Format and Counterbalancing Order
Counterbalancing Order
Presentation Format
M (ms)
SD (ms)
Organized-First
Organizeda
9.76
0.75
Scrambleda
9.70
0.82
Scrambled-First
Organized
9.21
0.89
Scrambled
10.10
0.80
Note. Analyses used the natural log of raw reaction time data. Subscript indicates non-significant
differences in confidence judgments via Tukey’s HSD test.
In the organized-first group, however, there was no difference between the amount of
time looking at the scrambled and organized conditions, d = 0.08, p = .669. All other pairwise
comparisons were significantly different (p < .001). It is possible that when participants first
reviewed the organized (i.e., less demanding) stimuli, subsequent scrambled stimuli were easier
to interpret.
Finally, participants spent more time reviewing stimuli in the high outcome density (M =
9.75, SD = 0.91) than the low outcome density (M = 9.64, SD = 0.84) conditions, although the
size of this effect was small, F(1, 1113) = 12.64, p < .001, d = 0.12. In addition to presentation
format and sample size, this suggests that outcome density may have also affected cognitive
load.
Time spent making causal judgments. Cognitive demand manipulations also affected
the amount of time participants spent making causal judgments (see Table 19).
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Table 19
Mean Time Spent Making Causal Judgments (in milliseconds)
Design
Sample Size
Outcome Density
Organized
24
Low
High
72
Low
High
Scrambled
24
Low
High
72
Low
High
Note. Table includes the natural log of raw reaction time data.

M
8.89
8.86
8.92
8.95
8.84
8.79
8.93
8.86

SD
0.80
0.83
0.84
0.88
0.84
0.84
0.89
0.85

As can be seen in Table 20, there was a significant three-way interaction between sample
size, presentation format, and the order of presentation format, F(1, 1113) = 4.49, p = .034. In
both the organized-first and scrambled-first groups, participants spent more time making causal
judgments in the first block of minerals. There was no effect of sample size on time spent
making causal judgments in the organized-first group, as revealed by Tukey’s HSD tests. In the
scrambled-first group, sample size only affected reaction time in the scrambled condition, where
participants spent longer reviewing the larger sample sizes, p = .028, d = 0.24.
Table 20
Mean Time Spent Making Causal Judgments for Scrambled-First Participants
Presentation Format
Sample Size
M (ms)
SD (ms)
Organized-First
Organized
24b
9.16
0.80
72b
9.24
0.82
Scrambled
24c
8.55
0.80
72c
8.52
0.75
Scrambled-First
Organized
24a
8.58
0.72
72a
8.60
0.77
Scrambled
24
9.10
0.78
72
9.29
0.81
Note. Analyses used the natural log of raw reaction time data. Subscript indicates non-significant
differences in confidence judgments via Tukey’s HSD test.
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Confidence Judgments
As can be seen in Table 21, participants were slightly more confident in the results from
the laboratory when outcome density was low (M = 5.45, SD = 2.44) than when outcome density
was high (M = 5.28, SD = 2.51), F(1, 1102.25) = 5.64, p = .018, d = .07, for the main effect of
outcome density.
Table 21
Mean Confidence Judgments
Design
Sample Size
Organized
24
72
Scrambled

24
72

Outcome Density
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High

M
5.65
5.30
5.56
5.39
5.51
5.29
5.09
5.15

SD
2.48
2.55
2.39
2.54
2.47
2.52
2.41
2.43

The analysis of confidence judgments revealed two significant interactions: an interaction
between presentation format and counterbalancing order, F(1, 1102.25) = 5.04, p = .025, and an
interaction between presentation format and sample size, F(1, 1102.25) = 3.59, p = .058. As seen
in Table 22, the effect of format order on confidence judgments was limited to the scrambled
condition. Participants in the organized-first group were less confident about scrambled results
from a laboratory than participants in the scrambled-first group. A post-hoc Tukey’s HSD test
revealed this difference to be significant, p = .003, d = 0.22. No other pairwise comparisons were
significant (all ps > .342).
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Table 22
Mean Confidence Judgments by Presentation Format and Counterbalancing Order
Order of Presentation
Presentation Format
M
SD
Organized-First
Organized
5.21
2.53
Scrambleda
5.17
2.67
Scrambled-First
Organizeda
5.74
2.42
Scrambled
5.36
2.20
Note. Subscript indicates significant differences in confidence judgments via Tukey’s HSD test.
The effect of presentation format was also modulated by a marginal interaction with
sample size. As seen in Table 23, participants were slightly less confident in data from the larger
than smaller sample size conditions. A Tukey’s post-hoc test revealed this difference to be driven
by reduced confidence in the scrambled-large sample condition than the organized-small sample,
d = 0.14, organized-large sample, d = 0.15, and scrambled-small sample, d = 0.11, conditions.
Table 23
Mean Confidence Judgments by Presentation Format and Sample Size
Presentation Format
Sample Size
M
SD
Organized
24a
5.47
2.52
72b
5.48
2.46
Scrambled
24c
5.40
2.49
72abc
5.12
2.42
Note. Subscript indicates significant differences in confidence judgments via Tukey’s HSD test.
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Discussion
Summary
In this experiment, I investigated the possible role of outcome density as a heuristic that
individuals use to reason about a cause-outcome relationship in a cognitively demanding causal
learning task. There were pervasive outcome density effects for causal judgments across all
conditions, adding to the prevalence of the outcome density effect for non-contingent causes in
the literature (e.g., Buehner et al., 2003). Unexpectedly, this pattern was not replicated for
estimates of causal power.8 Overall, the magnitude of the outcome density effect was
independent of cognitive load for both causal judgments and causal power estimates. Thus, use
of outcome density as a heuristic cannot explain the pervasive outcome density effects found for
causal judgments.
I also assessed the magnitude of the outcome density effect with regards to participants’
understanding of experimental design. Specifically, I hypothesized that individuals who correctly
answered questions regarding random assignment and/or the independence of alternative causes
would be less susceptible to the outcome density effect. The results did not support this
hypothesis, as there were pervasive outcome density effects for causal judgments by participants
who answered only one question correctly (N = 72) and participants who answered both
questions correctly (N = 48). There was no evidence of outcome density effects in the group of
participants who answered neither question correctly (N = 33). In line with the analysis of the
entire sample, outcome density had no effect on causal power estimates when analyzed by
comprehension check responses.
8

There was a reversal of the outcome density effect in the scrambled-small sample condition for
causal power estimates (i.e., greater causal power estimates in the low outcome density
condition). Because the effect was small (dz = 0.15) and only found in one condition, changes in
p(o) do not appear to affect causal power estimates overall.
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As with the whole-group analyses, the results did not support differential reliance on
outcome density as a heuristic between three groups. In the group that correctly answered one
question, there seemed to be an effect of presentation format that was dependent on the order of
presentation format and sample size. Because these results were not straightforward, we cannot
assume that the one-correct group relied more on outcome density as a heuristic in the more
cognitively demanding (i.e., scrambled) condition. In line with the whole-group analyses, there
was no effect of cognitive demand manipulations on causal power estimates in any of the three
groups.
Confidence and Sample Size
Although outcome density did not affect causal power estimates, there were pervasive
outcome density effects for causal judgments. If the outcome density effect is not due to
increased cognitive load, then why were causal judgments greater in the high outcome density
conditions? Here, there was no effect of sample size on causal judgments. However, previous
research suggests that causal judgments increase as the size of the sample increases (e.g.,
Liljeholm & Cheng, 2009). According to the statistical law of larger numbers, data becomes
increasingly reliable as the number of observations increase (Van Overwalle & Van Rooy,
2001). As such, modulations in causal judgments for non-contingent relationships may be due to
changes in the perceived reliability of a small or large sample (see Buehner & Cheng, 1997;
Liljeholm & Cheng, 2009).
The influence of reliability on causal judgments may stem from how researchers pose
causal questions (Liljeholm & Cheng, 2009). According to the conflation hypothesis (Buehner &
Cheng, 1997), the wording of specific questions may lead individuals to consider both their
assessment of causal strength and their belief in the reliability of the data when making a causal
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judgment. In Buehner et al.’s (2003) first experiment, participants made a judgment about how
strongly they thought a cause generated an outcome. The wording of this question is ambiguous,
as it is unclear whether the participant is rating the strength of the cause to produce the outcome
or the strength of their belief in the relationship.
In the latter interpretation, when a causal question is ambiguous, participants may
conflate causal judgments with confidence in the information provided. Thus, if the overall size
of the sample increases, causal judgments of a non-contingent relationship would be closer to
zero. For generative and preventive causes, causal judgments would increase as sample size
increases, thus increasing reliability in the strength of the cause. To test this, Buehner and Cheng
(1997) asked participants to make causal strength judgments based on information from either 16
individual trials (Experiment 1) or a summary of 100 trials (Experiment 2). Because there were
reduced outcome density effects in the larger sample condition, Buehner and Cheng (1997)
suggested that participants were more confident that the relationship was non-contingent.
In the current experiment, the conflation hypothesis would predict reduced outcome
density effects and increased confidence judgments for the larger sample conditions. However,
there were no effects of sample size on the magnitude of the outcome density effect, as outcome
density effects were pervasive across all conditions. Furthermore, participants were marginally
less confident in the scrambled condition when the sample size was large. As there was no effect
of sample size on confidence judgments in the organized condition, these findings do not support
increased confidence in larger samples.
The current experiment manipulated objective sample size, but there is a possibility that it
is not objective sample size that is most important, but rather virtual sample size. Liljeholm and
Cheng (2009) introduce the notion of virtual sample size as the number of trials in which a cause
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can prove its power. Recall the gardener example, in which a gardener applied Fertilizer A to 6
of 12 plants and Fertilizer B to 6 of 12 different plants. In plot A, 4 of 6 fertilized and 4 of 6
unfertilized plants grow, whereas in plot B, 2 of 6 fertilized and 2 of 6 unfertilized plants grow.
Using the information from the unfertilized plants, the gardener would expect 4 of 6
fertilized plants in plot A to grow because of alternative causes. Thus, Fertilizer A only had 2
cases (i.e., plants) in which it could prove its generative strength. In contrast, the gardener would
only expect 2 of 6 unfertilized plants in plot B to grow due to alternative causes. Fertilizer B
would therefore have 4 cases in which it could prove its generative strength. Both Fertilizer A
and Fertilizer B are non-causal, but the gardener may be less confident in the Fertilizer A data
because there were less cases in which it could prove its generative power. Thus, the gardener
may be more likely to give a causal judgment of zero for Fertilizer B, because the data for
Fertilizer B as a non-contingent cause is perceived as more reliable.
For contingent relationships, however, increases in virtual sample size should lead to
increased generative or preventive causal judgments. For generative causes, virtual sample size is
equal to the number of instances in which the outcome is absent prior to the cause. For
preventive causes, virtual sample size is equal to the number of instances in which the outcome
is present prior to the cause. If the cause proves its strength in more cases, this would increase
reliability in its generative or preventive power, thereby increasing causal judgments. In the
current experiment, however, participants simultaneously evaluated whether a given cause was
preventive or generative and were not given information about the number of outcomes prior to
the cause. Therefore, it is unclear what virtual sample size participants would have used on any
give trial.
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Ambiguity of Causal Judgment Question
Proposals of the conflation hypothesis assume that conflation of reliability and strength is
due to the ambiguity of the causal judgment question (e.g., Liljeholm & Cheng, 2009). Griffiths
and Tenenbaum (2005), however, dispute the influence of ambiguity. Instead, causal judgments
should incorporate information about the strength of the cause and confidence based on the
reliability of the sample. Thus, the ambiguous nature of the question should have no effect on
causal judgments. Their causal support model posits that individuals base causal judgments on
whether the observed data supports the target cause as present in the presence of the effect and
alternative background causes (Graph A of Figure 16) or absent in the presence of the effect and
alternative background causes (Graph B of Figure 16). The extent to which the data supports the
cause as producing the outcome is equal to the log of the probability of the data given Graph A
versus that given Graph B (see Equation 7).

A.
B.
Figure 16. According to the causal support model (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2005), individuals
make causal judgments using the probability that the evidence given Graph B outweighs the
evidence of an effect given Graph A.
!(!|!"#$% !)

Support = log (!(!|!"#$% !))

(7)

Neither the power PC model nor the ΔP rule accounts for effects of sample size, although
the conflation hypothesis (e.g., Liljeholm & Cheng, 2009) offers an explanation for why sample
size may affect causal power estimates. Griffiths and Tenenbaum’s (2005) model of causal
support considers that sample size may have multiple influences on causal judgments. When
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exposed to a larger sample of data, individuals will adjust their causal judgments as they are
introduced to new evidence and become more certain of these beliefs. As such, the causal
support model suggests that the influence of sample size is inextricable from beliefs about a
cause and an outcome.
As previously discussed, sample size did not affect causal judgments nor causal power
estimates in the current experiment. Therefore, the conflation hypothesis is unable to explain
possible reasons for these findings. It is possible, however, that outcome density effects for
causal judgments were due to the ambiguous nature of the question. In Buehner et al.’s (2003)
first experiment, participants made a causal judgment about how strongly they thought a cause
prevented or caused (i.e., generated) an outcome. The authors note that the wording of this
question made it unclear whether participants were making a judgment about the strength of the
cause in the presence of alternative causes (thus making a contingency judgment) or making a
judgment about the strength of the cause in the absence of alternative causes (thus making a
causal power judgment). In a second experiment, Buehner et al. (2003) changed the wording of
the question. Instead, participants were asked to estimate the number of outcomes if the putative
cause was introduced to 100 cases. Overall, participants’ causal power estimates were more
normative in comparison to Experiment 1.
These findings are analogous to the results of the present study. There were pervasive
outcome density effects when participants made a causal judgment about the extent to which a
mineral influenced headaches on a scale from -100 (the mineral has a strong influence on
preventing headaches) to +100 (the mineral has a strong influence on producing headaches).
However, outcome density had little to no effect on participants’ causal power estimates
calculated from responses to frequency estimates about the generative strength, preventive
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strength, or background rate of headaches for the mineral. Thus, outcome density effects were
predominantly found when the causal judgment question was ambiguous.
However, the ambiguous nature of the question cannot fully explain outcome density
effects for causal judgments. Participants demonstrated outcome density effects for causal
judgments across all conditions. If outcome density is due to ambiguity, then it should not occur
in each condition. For example, when the information is organized, the non-contingent nature of
the relationship is clearer and ambiguity of the question should not have an effect.
Alternatively, individuals could be relying on a cell A strategy, a heuristic where causal
judgments are based on the frequency of the joint presence of the cause and outcome (e.g.,
Schustack & Sternberg, 1981). Although it is not always used as the sole information to inform
causal judgments, individuals tend to weigh cell A information more heavily than information
from the other cells (see Figure 2) when making a causal judgment (Wasserman, Dorner, & Kao,
1990). Using the cell A strategy or outcome density to guide causal judgments are two distinctive
strategies, as the outcome density effect assumes individuals are relying on both cell A and cell C
(i.e., the probability of the outcome in the absence of the cause). The cell A strategy would
correspond more with findings regarding the order in which individuals rely on cell information,
in which cell use is ordered cell A > cell B > cell C > cell D (i.e., cell B is weighted more heavily
than cell C, see Wasserman et al., 1990).
Implications and Future Directions
Our findings do not suggest the use of outcome density as a heuristic to make causal
judgments about a non-contingent cause when cognitive demand is high. It is possible, however,
that these findings are due to the nature of the stimuli. At the beginning of the study, several
participants made unprompted comments about the nature of the stimuli. Therefore, I added a
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question to the end of the study that explicitly asked participants if they noticed anything. Of the
89 participants who responded, 51 (57.30%) noted that there were the same number of headaches
in the group that received the mineral and the group that did not receive the mineral.
Additionally, 28 (31.46%) stated that because the results were the same for both groups, there
was no relationship between the mineral and headaches.
Thus, the manipulations of cognitive demand may not have influenced the magnitude of
the outcome density effect because the non-contingent relationship was clearly visible (i.e., same
number of headaches in the presence and the absence of the cause). Future studies should
evaluate this for non-contingent causes in which cell A and cell C are unequal, making the noncontingent relationship less discernible. Furthermore, this would allow researchers to evaluate
whether these findings are due to reliance on a cell A strategy rather than outcome density as a
whole.
Perhaps the most important finding in this experiment is that outcome density effects
were pervasive for causal judgments but not causal power estimates. This may be due to the
ambiguous nature of the question, although it is not certain why the outcome density effects
would persist in all cognitive demand conditions.
Finally, the current experiment cannot entirely rule out outcome density as a heuristic
because the current experiment solely investigated non-contingent relationships. Outcome
density effects are also prevalent for generative and preventive relationships and thus, outcome
density should also be investigated with regard to cognitive manipulations for causal
relationships (e.g., Buehner et al., 2003).
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Appendix A
Imagine the following: A pharmaceutical company is developing an allergy medicine
comprised of several minerals. The company is working with 12 different laboratories to study
the effect that each individual mineral has on headaches. Each laboratory is responsible for
investigating the effects of one mineral.
Now imagine that you work for the pharmaceutical company. It is your job to evaluate
the results of each study and determine what effect each mineral has on headaches.
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